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Résumé
Ensuring uniform computation profiles is an efficient protection against some side channel
attacks (SCA) in embedded systems. Typical elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) scalar multi-
plication methods use two point operations (addition and doubling) scheduled according to
secret scalar digits. Euclidean addition chains (EAC) offer a natural SCA protection since only
one point operation is used. Computing short EACs is considered as a very costly operation
and no hardware implementation has been reported yet. We designed an hardware recoding
unit for short EACs which works concurrently to scalar multiplication. It has been integrated
in an in-house ECC processor on various FPGAs. The implementation results show similar
computation times compared to non-protected solutions, and faster ones compared to typical
protected solutions (e. g. 18 % speed-up over 192 b Montgomery ladder).
Mots-clés : elliptic curve cryptography ; scalar multiplication ; side channel attack ; counter-
measure ; addition chains ;
1. Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC [5]) has become the recommended standard in asymmetric pro-
tocols, as it provides equivalent security levels as RSA with smaller keys and benefits from
more efficient implementations. The main operation in ECC protocols is the scalar multiplication
[k]P, where a specific curve point P is multiplied by a large integer k (secret/public key). Most
scalar multiplication algorithms perform a sequence of curve-level operations that depends on
the ki (the bits or recoded digits of k). For instance, the basic double-and-add method either
performs a point doubling (DBL) or a DBL followed by a point addition (ADD) depending on
each ki. Such behavior is an issue when considering side channel attacks (SCAs [11]). Basically,
an attacker can perform physical observations of computations (e.g. the power consumption
of the device) and exploit them to recover the secret key being used in the device. ECC opera-
tions should be protected against SCAs in many applications, especially in embedded systems.
Several attacks [14] and countermeasures [8] have been proposed for ECC scalar multiplica-
tion. Countermeasures typically work by hiding or confusing the relation between the physical
behavior of a device and the secret key being used.
One proposal for a countermeasure is to perform scalar multiplication by using addition chains [9]
where a single curve point operation is used (i.e. ADD), providing intrinsic resilience to simple
power analysis (SPA). The scalar k has to be recoded into an addition chain C. At each step of the
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scalar multiplication, the operands of a new ADD are some of the previously computed results
or P. For speed purposes, the more specific euclidean addition chains (EAC) are used [12], allow-
ing for a faster ADD. Then the number of ADDs is directly related to C length. Up to now, it was
generally admitted that computing a short EAC is too expensive to make EAC competitive with
other SPA secure methods[12, 6]. So far, it appears that the complexity of efficient recoding has
precluded any attempt at an hardware implementation of EAC multiplication.
In this work, we propose a complete hardware implementation of a recoding unit for short EACs
and include it into an FPGA implementation of an ECC processor. Our unit allows efficient
EACs to be computed without incurring an additional cost for the scalar multiplication since it
works concurrently to the scalar multiplication operations. Section 2 quickly recalls ECC back-
ground and details EACs recoding methods. Details and implementation results about our
recoding unit are reported in Section 3. In Section 4, we compare our unit to other common
recoding methods (all integrated using the same ECC processor framework) and to other rare
works with practical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. State-of-the-Art
2.1. Definitions
Definition 1 Let k be an integer. An addition chain for k is a sequence of integers a0, a1, . . . , al satis-
fying : a0 = 1, al = k, and ai = ai1 + ai2 for some i2 ≤ i1 < i.
Definition 2 A euclidean addition chain (EAC) for k satisfies the additional condition : for i ≥ 3,
ai = ai1 + ai2 ⇒ (ai+1 = ai + ai1 or ai+1 = ai + ai2)
Indeed each ai+1 is obtained by adding ai to one of the terms of ai = ai1 +ai2 . This reduces the
access to previous values. If the largest summand is added, this is referred to as a big step and
noted 0 (respectively, adding the smallest summand is taking a small step noted 1). This way, an
EAC can be translated into a binary number.
One interesting property of this binary representation of EAC is that the reversed chain com-
putes the same integer [6] as illustrated in Figure 1 for k = 14.
2.2. Securing Scalar Multiplication Against SPA
EACs provide a natural way of protecting scalar multiplication against some side channel at-
tacks, in particular simple power analysis (SPA, see [11]), since a single curve operation (point
addition) is used. The scalar multiplication method based on EAC is presented in Figure 2. It
works by accumulating multiples of P, starting from P and [2]P, in an order determined by the
EAC such that the end result is [k]P. The same curve operation (namely an ADD) is performed
with every iteration, and the only dependence to the key bits is on which operand (eitherU1 or
U2) is kept in memory. This makes the algorithm resilient to simple power analysis.
The Montgomery ladder (ML [13]) and unified formulas (UF [2]) are other SPA resilient algo-
rithms that rely on using a single curve operation. They all ensure that the power profile of
time
1 2 3 4 5 9 14
current
terms
1 1 1 1 4 5
steps 1 1 0 0
1 2 3 5 8 11 14
current
terms
1 1 2 3 3 3
steps 0 0 1 1
FIGURE 1 – Examples of EACs for computing k = 14.
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EAC Point Multiplication : C = EAC(k), point P
1: (U1, U2)← (P, [2]P)
2: for ci ∈ C do
3: if ci = 0 then (U1, U2)← (U2, U1 +U2) (big step)
4: else (U1, U2)← (U1, U1 +U2) (small step)
5: return Q = U1 +U2 (Q = [k]P)
FIGURE 2 – EAC-based scalar multiplication algorithm
a scalar multiplication (which field operations are performed and when) does not depend on
key digits. ML always performs both point operations (ADD then DBL), whereas UF consist in
performing a sequence of field operations that works for both ADD and DBL.
Table 1 reports the cost of different methods for scalar multiplication in terms of field multipli-
cations per key bit or chain bit. It appears that the efficiency of protected algorithms tends to be
less than that of non-protected methods. In order to be comparable with unprotected methods,
the EAC recoding of an n-bit scalar k should have a length l shorter than 2n.
An EAC for a given integer k is obtained by applying the subtractive version of Euclid’s algo-
rithm. The second input to Euclid’s algorithm, an integer co-prime to k noted g in the follow-
ing, strongly impacts the length of the EAC. A random choice tends to lead to very long chains
(average length O(ln(k)2)[13]), which means a slow scalar multiplication.
2.3. Efficient EAC recoding
Finding a short EAC for a given scalar k is a random search process, where numerous starting
values for the first residue g are tested. A good heuristic is to look around g = k/φ, where φ is
the golden ratio [13]. This choice ensures that the end of the EAC is comprised of big steps, more
efficient by nature. Accurate bounds on their number are given in [7, corollary 1]. For instance,
given a 192-bit scalar, recoding values with g ∈
[
k
φ − 500,
k
φ + 500
]
(meaning a range search of
1000) guarantees that the EAC ends with 131 big steps. Combined with the reversal property of
EAC recoding, this allows us to compute the first (big) steps of the scalar multiplication while
performing several tentative EAC recodings. Our approach consists in the following steps :
1. for a given k, compute kφ (multiplication by the constant
1
φ ),
2. choose a range width 2ε and compute the minimal number of starting big stepsm,
3. in parallel :
– start the EAC scalar multiplication withm big steps,
– try all values of g in the interval [ kφ − ε,
k
φ + ε] to find a short EAC recoding of k,
4. finish the scalar multiplication using the shortest EAC.
We have performed simulations to measure the ratio between the EAC length l and the scalar
size n in function of the range width 2ε (i.e. nb. values tested around k/φ). Figure 3 reports our
TABLE 1 – Cost of scalar multiplication for several methods
Method DA NAF-3 NAF-4 ML UF EAC
Source [5] [5] [5] [13] [2] [12]
Cost (M/bit) 17 13.5 12.8 24 19 7∗
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FIGURE 3 – Statistical analysis of short EAC recoding.
results for the lengths of the shortest EAC found by exploring [ kφ−ε,
k
φ+ε], averaged over 1000
random scalars.
3. Proposed Short EAC Recoding Unit
We designed a complete and standalone hardware recoding unit for short EACs based on the
method presented above. To the best of our knowledge, it appears to be the first hardware
implementation of EAC recoding. Below, we describe our unit and the selection of its internal
parameters. Then, we report detailed implementation results on various FPGAs and for several
key sizes (n). For comparison purposes, we also report implementation results for other exist-
ing recoding methods on the same FPGAs. We were only able to identify one reference with
complete hardware implementation results (but for another type of recoding) used in ECC
scalar multiplication.
3.1. EAC Recoding Unit Architecture
The architecture of our recoding unit is described in Figure 4. For scalability, small delay and
simplicity purposes, we split all large (n-bit) values into small w-bit words (i.e. w  n). The
unit is centered around a single memory block (BRAM at top-left) which stores all the elements
used in the recoding : the key k, the inverse golden ratio 1/φ (constant), the scaled key k/φ,
the two remainders used in the subtractive euclidean algorithm a and b, the current addition
chain C and the shortest chain found so far, C ′. The address of each element in the memory is
the sum of the word index and the element offset (e.g. 0 for 1/φ, offset k, offset k/φ. . . ).
Key recoding works the following way : input k is first multiplied by 1/φ using an adder
(parallel-serial multiplication at top-right), and the result k/φ is memorized. The unit then iter-
ates over values of ε (stored in a small register), performing a subtractive euclidean algorithm
on values a = k and b = k/φ ± ε. The successive remainders a and b are subtracted from
one another using two adders (a(j)−b(j) and b(j)−a(j) at bottom left), and a comparison of the
new remainders is performed simultaneously (a
(j)
2 −b
(j) and b
(j)
2 −a
(j) at bottom right). Only
the carry out of these two last subtracters is used to select the new recoded term (small step or
big step) in C. The recoded bits of successive comparisons are concatenated locally in a w-bit
serial-in parallel-out (SIPO) register to provide chain CO˙nce the algorithm terminates (i.e. ei-
ther remainder reaches zero) the chain C is memorized, provided it is shorter than C ′ the best
chain so far (a small register in the control stores the smallest chain length).
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FIGURE 4 – Architecture of the proposed recoding unit.
3.2. Parameters Selection
In order to keep an efficient scalar multiplication, we target addition chains with length at
most 2n (e.g. chains of length 384 bits/steps for a 192-bit key). Based on the results presented
in Figure 3, this seems to be a reasonable constraint.
Our unit has been integrated for tests into an existing ECC processor (targeted for small area
on low-cost FPGAs), with internal word size 32-bit. To simply the external interface, we used
w = 32 bits within the recoding unit.
Our recoding unit requires just one single BRAM (18 Kb or 36 Kb for Xilinx FPGAs) for all
sensible key sizes (e.g. 160–600 bits). For a large key size nmax, the memory has to store at most
9× nmax bits (1× nmax for 1/φ, k, k/φ, a, b and 2× nmax for C and C ′). In practice nmax < 600,
so the maximum memory size is at most 5.4 Kb.
Our goal is to show the feasibility of EAC recoding in hardware. We tried to assume as little
as possible about the available hardware cells, and did not use hardwired DSP blocks present
in Xilinx FPGAs. Those DSP blocks are only useful during the key scaling step (multiplica-
tion by 1/φ) since we are using a subtractive euclidean algorithm (which only requires addi-
tions/subtractions).
3.3. Implementation Results on Various FPGAs
We implemented our recoding unit for several key sizes commonly used in embedded systems
(n ∈ {160, 192, 256, 384} bits) and on various FPGAs (both low-cost/high-performances and re-
cent/older devices). We also tried to evaluate the impact of optimization (area or speed) targets
in the ISE 14.1 Xilinx environment. Table 2 reports detailed implementation results for recoding
units on a Spartan-6 LX9 FPGA and the 4 key sizes. Reporting durations for a standalone unit is
not relevant since its real speed will be impacted by the crypto-processor. Timing performances
for a complete scalar multiplication are reported in Section 4.
In [3], Virtex-5 LX50T implementation results are reported for a recoding unit based on multi-
ple base number system (MBNS). We also provide implementation results for our unit on this
specific FPGA in the bottom of Table 2. We also report a few implementation results for other
FPGAs in Table 3 (due to page limit, we only report n = 192 bits).
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TABLE 2 – FPGA implementation results of dedicated units for various recoding methods (on
XC6SLX9/XC5VLX50T).
FP
G
A
BR
A
M optimization : area optimization : speed
Rec. area freq. area freq.
Meth. n slices (FF/LUT) MHz slices (FF/LUT) MHz
Sp
ar
ta
n6
EAC
160 1 209 (636/441) 151 211 (662/476) 151
192 1 195 (641/441) 160 223 (634/476) 157
256 1 203 (636/441) 155 214 (662/476) 154
384 1 228 (652/441) 154 215 (682/476) 159
Sp
ar
ta
n6 Bin.
&
ML
160 1 26 (70/101) 466 73 (194/237) 388
192 1 26 (70/101) 466 75 (231/270) 387
256 1 26 (70/101) 466 94 (300/336) 377
384 1 26 (70/101) 466 128 (446/475) 379
Sp
ar
ta
n6
NAF-3
160 1 35 (104/122) 328 34 (108/130) 382
192 1 35 (104/122) 328 34 (108/130) 382
256 1 35 (104/122) 322 34 (108/130) 364
384 1 42 (120/123) 248 43 (123/131) 332
Sp
ar
ta
n6
NAF-4
160 1 40 (109/125) 333 36 (113/134) 388
192 1 40 (109/125) 333 36 (113/134) 388
256 1 40 (109/125) 333 36 (113/134) 365
384 1 45 (129/126) 236 43 (132/135) 320
V
ir
te
x5
EAC 160 1 278 (711/509) 198 276 (709/476) 206
NAF-4 160 1 60 (148/161) 418 61 (147/157) 413
MBNS 160 1 153 (301/412) 232 323 (682/908) 202[3] n/12+ 4 clock cycles n/24+ 4 clock cycles
4. Comparison to Other Methods
4.1. Methodology
Comparing implementation results of recoding units without integrating them in a real ECC
processor is not sufficient. Our short EAC recoding unit and other units for commonly used
recoding methods have been integrated in an in-house compact ECC processor (designed for
low-cost embedded applications and will be distributed as open source in the future). The
global architecture of this processor is shown in Figure 5. The processor operates using sev-
eral dedicated arithmetic units (field adder, multiplier and inverter). The control flow in the
processor is microcoded for flexibility reasons. The microcode is stored in a dedicated BRAM
(“Prg. Mem.” on left). Another BRAM stores the coordinates of curve points handled during
computations (“Points Mem.” on right). The selected recoding unit (top left) outputs recoded
key digits (ki) that are used during microcode execution to alter the program flow.
4.2. Description of the Compared Methods
We compared our short EAC recoding unit with several representative recoding methods for
ECC scalar multiplication :
– The basic double-and-add (DA) (ki digits are directly used without any recoding [5, Sec. 3.3.1])
which provides a reference point but without any SPA protection.
– The more efficient non-adjacent form with window (NAF-w, a specific kind of signed-digit
recoding [5, Sec. 3.3.1]) methods with NAF-3 and NAF-4 versions, which are faster but do
not offer any protection against SPA.
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TABLE 3 – Implementation results of recoding units on various FPGA for n = 192 bits (XC3S50,
XC4VLX40, XC7A100T, XC7VX330T).
FP
G
A optimization : area optimization : speed
Recoding area freq. area freq.
Method slices (FF/LUT) MHz slices (FF/LUT) MHz
Sp
ar
ta
n
3 EAC 618 (911/541) 79 634 (911/574) 81
Bin. & ML 73 (108/133) 265 75 (110/134) 240
NAF-3 124 (193/154) 151 131 (197/161) 185
NAF-4 133 (210/157) 154 140 (214/165) 150
V
ir
te
x
4 EAC 565 (868/477) 170 597 (899/511) 191
Bin. & ML 73 (108/133) 404 162 (285/268) 409
NAF-3 120 (189/154) 264 127 (192/161) 379
NAF-4 128 (205/157) 266 135 (210/165) 375
A
rt
ix
7 EAC 227 (637/435) 151 277 (667/471) 145
Bin. & ML 25 (86/101) 453 27 (86/102) 478
NAF-3 37 (120/122) 319 43 (124/125) 418
NAF-4 51 (125/125) 311 42 (130/129) 415
V
ir
te
x
7 EAC 226 (642/434) 215 281 (762/468) 216
Bin. & ML 25 (86/101) 435 67 (220/270) 412
NAF-3 40 (119/122) 413 47 (123/125) 415
NAF-4 48 (124/125) 417 46 (128/129) 472
– The Montgomery ladder (ML [13]) enforces uniform sequences of operations against SPA.
– The unified formulas (UF) from [2].
– Our short EAC recoding unit presented in this work.
They have been implemented in dedicated units and integrated in our ECC processor. DA, ML
and UF methods share identical hardware configurations (only the microcode differs).
4.3. Comparison Results and Analysis
The ECC processor has been synthesized, placed and routed with each recoding unit. Table 4
reports area values with number of slices, flip-flops (FFs) and look-up tables (LUTs), as well as
operating frequencies and average durations for a complete scalar multiplication. Due to page
limit, Table 4 only presents results for n = 192 bits and Spartan-6 FPGA (similar behavior is
obtained for other n and FPGAs). Our solution with short EAC recoding is 25 % faster than
the commonly used Montgomery ladder for an area overhead of 39 %. This area overhead is
important, but one should keep in mind that our ECC processor is a very small one. Integrating
an advanced recoding unit impacts a lot the total area. We expect to get a smaller overhead for
larger processors.
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of the EAC recoding process which works concurrently to the
beginning of the scalar multiplication. As described in Section 2, the first bits of the reversed
chain always correspond to big steps (there is a theoretical minimal number of big steps [7]) and
determines a maximum recoding effort. The recoding must be finished in the worst case before
the theoretical deadline (about 40 % of the complete scalar multiplication for our parameters).
We recoded more than 10000 scalars for each key size n. Results presented left column are
normalized to the duration of the ML version (for similar SPA protection). The speed-up is in
20–25 %. The right column presents the probability that a recoding process is not finished when
the deadline arrives. For small n, our EAC recoding unit is fast enough the ensure about 25 %
average speedup compared to ML. But for n = 384 is 11 % of cases the recoded chain is slightly
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FIGURE 5 – Architecture of the ECC processor used for comparisons.
TABLE 4 – FPGA implementation results of the ECC processor with various recoding methods
for n = 192 bits (on Spartan-6 XC6SLX9).
recoding
BR
A
M optim. area freq. dura. SCA
method target slices (FF/LUT) MHz ms prot.
EAC 3 area 534 (1813/1508) 132 35.8 Yspeed 556 (1872/1523) 137 34.5
DA 2 area 429 (1243/1134) 191 30 Nspeed 399 (1302/1222) 177 32.5
ML 2 area 429 (1243/1134) 191 42.5 Yspeed 399 (1302/1222) 177 45.8
UF 2 area 429 (1243/1134) 191 50.4 Yspeed 399 (1302/1222) 177 54.4
NAF-3 2 area 422 (1280/1157) 181 25.2 Nspeed 423 (1321/1242) 175 26.1
NAF-4 2 area 420 (1277/1161) 158 27.3 Nspeed 425 (1233/1246) 177 24.4
larger than 2n. This reduces the average speedup to 20 %.
Few previous works present complete hardware implementation results for advanced recoding
schemes against SCAs for ECC scalar multiplication, see Table 5. Comparing all those solutions
with ours is quite complex since several works used a large number of hardwired DSP blocks.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we report the first hardware implementation of euclidean addition chains for ECC.
Hardware implementation of EAC recoding is efficient thanks to some mathematical proper-
ties : the insurance of ending the chain by several big steps, the reversibility of chains and the
efficiency of addition formula. Our prototype implementation adds a limited area overhead
and provides speed improvements over protected schemes such as Montgomery Ladder and
unified formulas.
We identified possible optimizations for future work. We are faithful that this unit will be com-
petitive in terms of area and speed even with non-protected methods such as double-and-add
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FIGURE 6 – Statistical behavior of the proposed EAC recoding unit (normalized to ML). Left
column shows average (middle curve) plus/minus standard deviation (top/bottom curves).
Right column shows the probability of recoding failure (i.e. l < 2n before the deadline).
TABLE 5 – Implementation results for ECC processors with recoding methods from the litera-
ture (? means estimated values).
W
or
k area
BR
A
M
D
SP
freq. dura. SCA
slices (FF/LUT) MHz ms FPGA prot.
[10]
4655 (4876/5740) 11 37 250 0.44 Virtex-4 Y
1725 (4792/4177) 10 37 291 0.38 Virtex-5 Y
256 b, generic curve, randomized window recoding
[4] 6203 ALMs 0 92 160 0.44 Stratix-II Y192 b, generic curve, Montgomery Ladder
[3]
1793 (3641/6182) 6 0 155 7.6? Virtex-5 N
2427 (4297/6981) 6 0 142 5.8? Virtex-5 N
160 b, generic curve, MBNS recoding
[1] 1828 (n.a./n.a.) 6? 0 24 22.1 Virtex-5 Y2049 (n.a./n.a.) 6? 0 24 15.5 Virtex-5 Y
256 b, SECP curve, Montgomery Ladder
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and NAF-3, while providing natural protection against simple power analysis. It remains to
be seen whether the addressing signal used to select the steps (big or small) may leak in the
context of a Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
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